Citation

Brown M. Leg. Crim. Psychol. 1997; 2(2): 219-245.

Copyright

(Copyright © 1997, British Psychological Society, Publisher John Wiley and Sons)

DOI

10.1111/j.2044-8333.1997.tb00345.x

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Purpose. Despite much comment and theorizing in the psychological literature on the proper relationship between psychology and law, the fact remains that little use is made of psychological research in the legal arena. The purpose of this paper is to consider why this might be and to suggest an explanation that focuses upon the way these different fields hold widely divergent views on truth.Argument. It is argued that the failure of law to avail itself of psychological knowledge is not due to institutional boundary disputes or procedural conflicts but rather reflects fundamental differences in the legal and psychological criteria for knowledge. Popper's distinction between methodological nominalism and essentialism is used to demonstrate the core differences between legal and psychological requirements for understanding, but it is emphasized that while these ultimately lead to different forms of knowledge, the disciplines have in fact developed similar institutional procedures for generating and regulating knowledge production.Conclusions. It is therefore concluded that resolution of the stand-off between psychology and law will not be achieved by tinkering with surface procedures but requires a fundamental re-evaluation of what constitutes acceptable knowledge to occur within each discipline. Instances where this has occurred (e.g. legal realism in law, critical psychology) demonstrate that it is not beyond the capacity of either party to accommodate change and point towards further avenues for development in the psychology-law discourse.

Language: en