Citation

Cushing BS. J. Theor. Biol. 1995; 175(2): 173-176.

Copyright

(Copyright © 1995, Elsevier Publishing)

DOI

10.1006/jtbi.1995.0129

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

The classic hawk-dove game predicts that hawk is an Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) when value (V) is greater than cost (C). This paper discusses how the hawk-dove game is affected if a hawk can damage a dove, regardless of the dove's intentions to withdraw from a contest. The ability of a hawk to damage a dove significantly alters the expected payoffs for the participants with hawk now being an ESS whenV>C,dependent on the probability of a hawk being able to inflict damage on a dove. If this probability is ≥ 0.5 then hawk is an ESS regardless of the ratio of value to cost. The conditions under which this type of game may actually occur in nature and how the game relates to human interactions are also discussed.