Citation

Valeriano B. Afr. Secur. 2011; 4(3): 195-221.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2011, Informa - Taylor and Francis Group)

DOI

10.1080/19392206.2011.599270

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

The steps-to-war theory suggests that power politics strategies, such as alliance formation, military buildups, hardliner domestic actors, and aggressive crisis bargaining, often have the unintended consequence of escalating a crisis to war. The theory has gathered extensive empirical support in large-N studies, but only a handful of studies have examined the expectations of the theory as applied to specific regions. This paper questions if the steps-to-war theory can explain wars in a region where one might not expect power politics methods to be in operation. I first test the theory statistically by using a sample of only African dyads and then employ a structured comparison and process-tracing methods to examine the steps taken prior to two African wars, the Ogaden War (1977?1978) and the Ugandan-Tanzanian War (1978?1979). This research is unable to falsify the theory in the Africa region, although the theory does require modifications in that the actions of rebel groups are important in motivating territorial demands and arms acquisitions in the region.