Citation

Omeje K. Afr. Secur. 2010; 3(3): 168-189.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2010, Informa - Taylor and Francis Group)

DOI

10.1080/19392206.2010.503856

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Sudan's postcolonial history has been riddled with destabilizing violence. Different intellectual metaphors have been used to help analyze the conundrum. Two of the emerging metaphors have their roots in economics, namely the discourses on ?markets of violence? and ?oligopolies of violence.? Is contemporary Sudan either a market of violence or an oligopoly of violence? I argue in this paper that the ?markets? and ?oligopolies? of violence debate are both analytically useful and could be harmonized to help elucidate the issue of political violence in postcolonial Sudan. The empirical features of the two paradigms are not mutually exclusive, albeit the metaphor of oligopolies of violence seems to represent a qualitative improvement on the markets of violence framework with regard to understanding Sudanese political history. More significantly, the paper argues that the empirical foundation for embedded political violence in postcolonial Sudan could be found in the construction and nature of the colonial state and, to a lesser extent, precolonial formations. The paper explores and analyzes the historiography and nexus of social forces at play in precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial Sudan, as well as the roles of various political actors in the markets/oligopolies of violence.