Citation

Burgess SF. Afr. Secur. 2008; 1(2): 69-91.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2008, Informa - Taylor and Francis Group)

DOI

10.1080/19362200802479772

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

In Africa, peacemakers have established arrangements to fashion integrated militaries and police forces out of what were warring government and rebel forces. Success has been achieved because of a combination of four factors: state strength, external involvement and assistance, quality of contending forces, and management of the process, and failure has occurred because one or more of those factors have been absent. Since most African states in conflict are weak and failing, the final three factors take on added importance. External supervision and training have expedited integration by ensuring that professional forces are developed. The quality of forces has determined whether or not they are capable of integrating, and the quality of leadership has determined whether or not the leaders are suitable for officer training and development. In regard to process management, first, the principles, values, and objectives of integration have been reflected in comprehensive peace settlements. Second, there is a strategy and resources for the demobilization of combatants. Third, major parties have the political will to ensure that the rank-and-file comply with leadership directives. Fourth, all parties have been included in a flexible and adaptable process. Fifth, a realistic assessment has been made of the capacity of the state and security forces to perform complex tasks. Integrating security forces may not be a feasible option. In some instances, the militias are so corrupted or the internal situation is so volatile that integration cannot be attempted. Alternatives to integration are building a new national army and police force or preserving the national military and police force and excluding or absorbing nonstate militias.