Citation

Welsh CR, Debenham AA. Reliab. Eng. 1986; 14(1): 51-61.

Copyright

(Copyright © 1986, Elsevier Publishing)

DOI

10.1016/0143-8174(86)90089-2

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

The application and development of risk analysis and assessment in our respective organisations are being pursued to justify reactor plant against an agreed safety target. An adequate justification of risk estimates for this purpose should demonstrate that all reasonable steps have been taken to indicate completeness in the identification of potential hazards to the plant which could lead to public risk.

This paper describes the use of a method based on hazards and fault sequence analyses which aims to establish all conceivable initiating events, the responses of the plant and operators to the events, the systems and components involved in the responses and their potential modes of failure. Assurance against omissions is given by a compilation of information from specialists most qualified to provide it, the accounting for interactions between different parts of the plant and the promotion of logical thought processes at the various stages of the analyses.