Citation

Jessup EL. Res. Transp. Econ. 1996; 4: 131-159.

Copyright

(Copyright © 1996, Elsevier Publishing)

DOI

10.1016/S0739-8859(96)80008-4

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

The primary objective of this paper was to investigate the economic incentive to overload trucks above the legal weight limit and provide a case study evaluating the effectiveness of Washington's fine system in deterring the economic incentive or recapturing the financial damage to roads and highways, through the court and legal process. A conceptual model of trucker's incentive to overload was developed and the relationship between that incentive and the effectiveness of the judicial system was then empirically investigated. This was accomplished through interviews with weight enforcement officials and court personnel in addition to a detailed examination of over 8,000 overweight citations from nine counties between September 1991 and August 1992. The punitive rate, evaluated through the average percent of original fine paid, on contested cases for the state was 56.3 percent. For cases that were contested and found guilty, the punitive rate was only 63 percent, indicating that 37 percent of potential revenue from this source is being lost in the court system. The punitive rate on all cases did not vary much across different counties. However, the average percent of original fine paid on contested cases was much higher for smaller counties and counties without port of entries, suggesting that judges in smaller counties regard overweight violations a more serious offense than judges from larger counties. These results can be used to provide a better understanding of firm's decision to overload and inform lawmakers and judges about the purpose and role of the fee and fine system in controlling overweight violations and financial recovery of road damage.