Citation

Polinsky AM, Shavell S. Int. Rev. Law Econ. 1998; 18(3): 305-324.

Copyright

(Copyright © 1998, Elsevier Publishing)

DOI

10.1016/S0144-8188(98)00009-X

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

This article uses a two-period version of the standard economic model of deterrence to study whether sanctions should depend on an individual's record of prior convictions--his offense history. The principal contribution of the article is to demonstrate that it may be optimal to treat repeat offenders disadvantageously because such a policy serves to enhance deterrence: When an individual contemplates committing an offense in the first period, he will realize that if he is caught, not only will he bear an immediate sanction, but also--because he will have a record--any sanction that he bears in the second period will be higher than it would be otherwise.