Citation

Jost PJ. Int. Rev. Law Econ. 1997; 17(4): 491-508.

Copyright

(Copyright © 1997, Elsevier Publishing)

DOI

10.1016/S0144-8188(97)00042-2

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

The responsibilities of a regulatory agency involved in the law enforcement process vary considerably. In this paper we consider three different legal procedures in the process of law enforcement: First, we assume that the regulatory agency is in charge of the detection of offenses. Conviction takes place via court trial. Second, we assume that the regulatory agency has the power to fine an individual if there is some evidence that he did not comply with the law. An individual who has been fined by the agency has the right to lodge an appeal. If he makes use of this right, the question whether or not he complied with the law will be reconsidered. Here we discuss two different legal procedures: The case is decided by court, and the regulatory agency is required to provide sufficient evidence for its decision. Or, the agency reconsiders its decision and decides whether or not to press charges in court. We formalize these three legal procedures in a game-theoretic context and analyze the implications of the procedural regulations on the decision of a potential offender to behave illegally.