Citation

Kobayashi BH, Lott JR. Int. Rev. Law Econ. 1996; 16(4): 397-416.

Copyright

(Copyright © 1996, Elsevier Publishing)

DOI

10.1016/S0144-8188(96)00034-8

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Given the continuing controversy over defendants' buying justice through defense expenditures, this paper shows that disparities in criminal defense expenditures can insure that it is the guilty and not the innocent who will be punished. Our model allows defense and prosecution expenditures to be simultaneously determined. We show that criminal defense expenditures result in lower expected penalties for the innocent at trial and that they helo ensure that plea bargaining efficiently screens defendants even when differential risk aversion is present. Finally, we examine how differences in defendant's wealth and the use of public defenders affect the legal system's ability to differentiate the innocent from the guilty.