Citation

Carbonara E, Pasotti P. Int. Rev. Law Econ. 2010; 30(4): 317-328.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2010, Elsevier Publishing)

DOI

10.1016/j.irle.2010.08.005

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Minority-protection laws often differ over time and across societies. We show how the dynamic interaction between strong and weak social groups may account for these differences and their evolution. We assume that interaction occurs in a democratic environment, where representative institutions design norms according to the perceived voters' support. Minority protection is strong when social reaction to discrimination is high. Interestingly, when discriminators harm members of weak social groups more if they do not react against discrimination, an initial increase in minority protection immediately reduces the level of social unrest, giving rise to fluctuations, as protest starts again when discrimination is back to high levels.