Citation

Miceli TJ. Int. Rev. Law Econ. 2007; 27(2): 258-268.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2007, Elsevier Publishing)

DOI

10.1016/j.irle.2007.06.003

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

This paper examines the optimal use of criminal solicitation as a law enforcement strategy. The benefits are greater deterrence of crime (due to the greater likelihood of apprehension), and the savings in social harm as some offenders are diverted away from committing actual crimes through solicitation. The costs are the expense of hiring undercover cops and the greater likelihood of punishment. The optimal use of solicitation balances these factors. The paper also examines the justification for the entrapment defense, which exonerates those caught in a criminal solicitation but who otherwise had no predisposition to commit a crime.