Citation

des Places SB, Deffains B. Int. Rev. Law Econ. 2003; 23(4): 345-364.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2003, Elsevier Publishing)

DOI

10.1016/j.irle.2003.07.001

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Traditional analysis considers that the granting of protection to refugees is an international public good, and thus explains both the heterogeneousness in refugee protection in Europe and the spiral that has hardened the EU Member States' asylum legislation from the mid-1980s onwards as the result of free riding in the provision of the good. In contrast, the paper considers that the heterogeneousness in refugee distribution is best explained by the joint product model and that the spiral of restriction is best explained by the common pool resource model and regulatory competition theory. The paper explains, and gives empirical evidence of the emergence and development of a competitive game among the EU Member States, and shows the result and the consequence of this upon cooperative attempts among States.