Citation

Baik KH, Kim IG. Int. Rev. Law Econ. 2001; 21(3): 271-285.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2001, Elsevier Publishing)

DOI

10.1016/S0144-8188(01)00062-X

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

This paper extends the two-period model in Polinsky & Rubinfeld (1991) by introducing the possibility of social learning of illicit gains between the second and the first period. We show that if offenses result more from social learning of illicit gains than from an inherent characteristic of born offenders, it may be desirable to punish first-time offenders as severely as repeat offenders. This sheds light on deterring property crime, like larcency or auto theft, which exhibits a high degree of social learning. This may also provide a logical foundation for supporting harsh government coercion of loosely organized crime (such as a criminal street gang) in which the social learning is likely to be prevalent and illicit gains become a public good to co-offenders, from start to finish.