Citation

Mullin WP. Int. Rev. Law Econ. 2001; 21(1): 87-102.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2001, Elsevier Publishing)

DOI

10.1016/S0144-8188(00)00052-1

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Gun buyback programs have become widespread in the United States. This paper offers a model of gun demand in which people make decisions about gun ownership as they would any other durable consumer good. Two insights are generated. First, if the buyback program is unanticipated and never-to-be-repeated, then the buyback program will reduce gun holdings only temporarily, by affecting the timing of consumption. Second, a repeated buyback program, formally analyzed as a permanent buyback program, will actually raise gun holdings, since it permanently lowers ownership costs. Current, repeated buybacks will therefore have the opposite effect of what buyback proponents intend.JEL classification: H30; L68