Citation

Babinec F, Ivánek L, Ficbauer V. Process. Saf. Environ. Prot. 2005; 83(5): 437-442.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2005, Institution of Chemical Engineers and European Federation of Chemical Engineering, Publisher Hemisphere Publishing)

DOI

10.1205/psep.04215

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

A successful implementation of the SEVESO II Directive requires, apart from other things, the presence of real experts, i.e., authors of safety documentation and independent experts in reviewing the safety documentation, in the chemical process safety domain. The absence of such experts combined with continually escalating requirements of reviewing authorities (and IPPC Directive implementation) has major consequences for Czech industry. The result of such a state is a very low number of accepted safety documents, an absence of major risk insurance and a time delay in the implementation of process safety measures. The level of safety documentation reflects the level of the team that produces the documentation. For hazard identification assessment, inconsistent screening methods are often used. However, the demand for a detailed and demonstrative risk assessment within a complete safety documentation (programme, report, emergency plan) as expressed in SEVESO II Directive is a demand for a complex and detailed analytical safety study; a detailed hazard identification and risk assessment. Last major accidents in the Czech Republic certify the following significant problem: long-term absence of the 82/501/EEC--SEVESO (I) Council Directive in the Czech legislation, and, subsequently, a lack of safety culture (deficient sense of the necessity of prevention).