Citation

Inarra E, Laruelle A. J. Theor. Biol. 2012; 305: 110-117.

Affiliation

BRiDGE, Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, Universidad del País Vasco, Avenida Lehendakari Aguirre, 83 E-48015 Bilbao, Spain.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Publishing)

DOI

10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.03.034

PMID

22498802

Abstract

In this paper we consider the hawk-dove game played by a finite population formed by two types of individual who fail to recognize their own type but do observe the type of their opponent. In this game we find two evolutionarily stable strategies and show that in each of them one type of individuals suffers more aggression than the other. When a continuum of individuals is considered there are no evolutionarily stable strategies but neutrally stable strategies.

Language: en