Citation

Hamid AFA. Tonan Ajia Kenkyu 2007; 44(4): 444-465.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2007, Kyōto Daigaku Tōnan Ajia Kenkyū Sentā)

DOI

unavailable

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Unlike many Middle Eastern states which have unequivocally resorted to repression tooutflank Islamist opposition, Malaysia's response to Islamic resurgence since the formativedecade of 1980s has typically combined cautious encouragement of official dakwah (missionaryeffort) and checks on activities of independent Islamist groups so as to minimisepossibilities of violence. Coercion was employed only as a temporary measure. Enjoyinga relatively buoyant economy, problems such as mass demonstrations, riots, "terror"campaigns and assassination attempts, have largely eluded Malaysia. The state's strategyof coopting major Islamists and committing itself to an Islamisation programme has addedto the regime's legitimacy. Previously strident Islamists have decided to discard theiranti-establishment image and pursue their Islamic state ambitions through channelsacceptable to the dominant political elite. Islamists' verbal and tacit espousal of Islamisationsignal the fruition of the state's accommodationist strategy which, in turn, hasobviated the need for Islamists to indulge in fifth-column activities. In turn, the mellowingof mainstream Islamist trends have convinced the state that the continuance of piecemealIslamisation features, coupled with ambiguous assurances as to its long-term intentions ofguiding the nation towards a modern Islamic polity, are sufficient to contain the sociopoliticalinfluence of Islamic movements.
Unlike many Middle Eastern states which have unequivocally resorted to repression tooutflank Islamist opposition, Malaysia's response to Islamic resurgence since the formativedecade of 1980s has typically combined cautious encouragement of official dakwah (missionaryeffort) and checks on activities of independent Islamist groups so as to minimisepossibilities of violence. Coercion was employed only as a temporary measure. Enjoyinga relatively buoyant economy, problems such as mass demonstrations, riots, "terror"campaigns and assassination attempts, have largely eluded Malaysia. The state's strategyof coopting major Islamists and committing itself to an Islamisation programme has addedto the regime's legitimacy. Previously strident Islamists have decided to discard theiranti-establishment image and pursue their Islamic state ambitions through channelsacceptable to the dominant political elite. Islamists' verbal and tacit espousal of Islamisationsignal the fruition of the state's accommodationist strategy which, in turn, hasobviated the need for Islamists to indulge in fifth-column activities. In turn, the mellowingof mainstream Islamist trends have convinced the state that the continuance of piecemealIslamisation features, coupled with ambiguous assurances as to its long-term intentions ofguiding the nation towards a modern Islamic polity, are sufficient to contain the sociopoliticalinfluence of Islamic movements.