CONTACT US: Contact info
|
Citation |
Benchekroun TH, Pierlot S. Work 2012; 41: 3051-3061. |
|
Affiliation |
Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers, Centre de Recherche sur le Travail et Développement (CRTD), 41 rue Gay-Lussac, 75005 Paris, France. |
|
Copyright |
(Copyright © 2012, IOS Press) |
|
DOI |
|
PMID |
22317184 |
|
Abstract |
Our world of industry and technology has, over the years, has seen undeniable successes in terms of safety and reliability. But major catastrophes and dramatic accidents continue, even today, to cause major human and material losses and to threaten the environment with pollution on a massive scale. Could these disasters and these accidents have been foreseen and avoided? Would it have been possible to anticipate their occurrence by detecting signals of potential hazards? It is unsettling to notice, through retrospective analysis of such events, that warnings had been issued long before the catastrophe or accident took place. This raises several questions, which we will attempt to address in this paper. Why are whistleblowers often not listened to, threatened, or simply ignored? Why are their warnings viewed as "bad omens" instead of essential resources to ensure safety? Do whistleblowers stand idly by, or do they implement individual and collective strategies to make themselves heard? Which managerial and organizational conditions are conducive to developing empowerment in whistleblowers? Based on four case studies, we attempt to address these questions, and offer a first level of analysis and explanation by proposing and defining two new concepts: operative resilience and strategic resilience. Language: en |