Citation

Ebihara T. Cathol. Stud. 2002; 71: 83-117.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2002, Sophia University)

DOI

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PMID

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Abstract

This study concerns a fundamental point at which theologians make it possible for Christian theology to dialog with other religions. A fundamental question for this might be the following : Is it possible for a religious person to hear the faith confession of another religion, to receive it and to respond appropriately to it ? For a certain kind of religious person, it may be self-evident that the very event of hearing a faith confession different from one's own is in itself unacceptable. Throughout history a fierce tension has been clearly apparent between Jewish and Christian believers, and this might show that "Jesus is the Christ" has been at the center of beliefs having to do with faith confession. Relying on the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, this study will attempt to search for what lies at the root of these beliefs, focusing on their relation to Judaism. To begin with, what are the conditions for a way of 'saying' some-thing about faith related matters ? In Deuteronomy, the word 'today' appears some 70 times. The reason for this high frequency is being that 'today' points to the 'here and now' where God's dynamism rules. It is where one hears God speak, and where one responds to God speaking through one's deeds. The 'here and now' is where God's dynamism acts in human history, where one receives God's dynamic speaking, even though this speaking is past in tense. One's response to God speaking is always being placed before God ('in God's face') . In this way, the dynamism of God makes both the creature as testifying and God as being testified to be present as a sign at the same time. This is why 'saying' appears consistently in the Bible as testifying. Still, is the uniqueness evident of the thing to be testified to ? The 'saying' is taken into the 'said' at once anything 'said' thus being open to a third person. Further, it seems at least unavoidable that the 'said' involves a diversity of hearers. In addition, the testimony, especially of those people in history who groan in defeat, seems to reject the uniqueness that is in the totality of 'historical fact'. Thus, according to hevinas, the enclosedness brought about by first-person testimony to history demands those special others who are named 'the son', 'the Messiah', who will pierce an opening in this enclosedness. This 'son' or 'Messiah' is the one who receives and continues on in the way of 'saying' appropriately about the history what is to be 'said'. Certainly, the first person qualified to be 'what Israel is' in the deuteronomic history is the son, above all, the eldest son. However, the identity of the act of testifying achieved through the testifier's identity does not necessarily guarantee the identity of the thing to be testified to. Therefore, supposing that one try to guarantee the grounds for the identity of the thing to be testified to on the basis of the uniqueness of the testifiers, this must be done through the very structure of the testifying. An existential judgment is inevitable in the appropriateness of 'say-ing', since the one who testifies can be said to 'exist' only in his qualification of 'saying' appropriately. Thus, for the 'testifier' to be constituted, the appropriateness of the 'saying' inevitably becomes progressively excessive. In Judaism, such excessiveness is already realized in sonship and is further realized in observance of the Torah and progressive emphasis on that observance ; in Christianity, excessive appropriateness of 'saying' is realized in public proclamation that 'Jesus is the Christ'. 'Testimony' is possible only in the form in which the thing to be testified to is absent. Humanity first requires God's arrival and God's presenting, but this is neither an event nor an existent in itself. Through an event as a sign, God's arrival is rather a pure possibility as a function, a difference, presenting God as the meaning of absence. The 'sign' and what it signifies are thus constituted, and through repetition and retelling, preserves this possibility as first and foremost. What, however, is the point of origin from which such 'saying' arises ? It certainly does not exist beyond the level of 'saying' possible to Jewish and Christian believers. To the extent that theology as testimony is itself embodied in obedience to the command to 'bring to clarity', the theologian can never be exempt from the obligation to seek for the qualifications of the one who testifies. Furthermore, because of this command, assertive expression in a faith confession as the realization of clarity cannot avoid the betrayal of a delay on the part of the testifier with regard to what is to be testified to, since he 'says' that it has already been accomplished. Here again we meet the impossibility of avoiding excessiveness, and it is also the impossibility of not testifying. Insofar as "proximity, difference which is non-indifference, is responsibility" (Levinas), one who has been face to face with ('in the face of') another has already made a response impossible to undo. For this reason, Christian believers, although they have no right to say what it means to be a Jewish believer, nonetheless bear total responsibility toward Jewish believers. Thus, following the thought of Levinas, we are led to conclude that an asymmetric continuity between Jewish and Christian believers lies at the root of beliefs having to do with faith confession.