Citation

Persson M, Siven CH. Int. Econ. Rev. 2007; 48(1): 211-233.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2007, Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Publisher John Wiley and Sons)

DOI

10.1111/j.1468-2354.2007.00423.x

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Two real-world observations are not easily replicated in models of crime. First, although capital punishment is optimal in the standard Becker model, it is rarely observed in the real world. Second, criminal procedure and the evaluation of evidence vary across societies and historical periods, the standard of proof being sometimes very high and sometimes quite low. In this article, we develop a general equilibrium model of judicial procedure allowing for innocent persons being convicted. We show that the median voter theorem applies to this model, making judicial procedure endogenous. So formulated, the model can replicate both empirical observations.