Citation

Gassebner M, Jong‐A‐Pin R, Mierau JO. Int. Econ. Rev. 2011; 52(4): 1253-1270.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2011, Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Publisher John Wiley and Sons)

DOI

10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00666.x

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Terrorism can strengthen or weaken electoral support for ruling governments. We show in a simple model of coalition formation that, regardless of the direction of a public opinion shock, the impact of terrorism on cabinet duration is ambiguous. However, in an analysis of a data set including 2,400 cabinets in over 150 countries in the period 1970-2002, we find that terrorism, on average, shortens cabinet duration. This result is robust for a range of alternative terror measures and is present in both democratic as well as autocratic political regimes.