Citation

Calvó‐Armengol A, Zenou Y. Int. Econ. Rev. 2004; 45(3): 939-958.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2004, Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Publisher John Wiley and Sons)

DOI

10.1111/j.0020-6598.2004.00292.x

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Delinquents compete with each other in criminal activities but benefit from being friends with other criminals by learning and acquiring proper know-how on the crime business. We study the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of this game in which individuals decide first to work or to become a criminal and then the crime effort provided if criminals. We show that multiple equilibria with different numbers of active criminals and levels of involvement in crime activities may coexist and are only driven by the geometry of the pattern of links connecting criminals.