Citation

Chapman HA, Anderson AK. Emot. Rev. 2011; 3(3): 255-257.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2011, International Society for Research on Emotion, Publisher SAGE Publishing)

DOI

10.1177/1754073911402389

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Although much research on emotion and morality has treated emotion as a relatively undifferentiated construct, recent work shows that moral transgressions can evoke a variety of distinct emotions. To accommodate these results, we propose a multiple-appraisal model in which distinct appraisals lead to different moral emotions. The implications of this model for our understanding of the relationship between appraisals, emotions and judgments are discussed. The complexity of moral emotional experience presents a methodological challenge to researchers, but we submit that a complete understanding of human morality must acknowledge the differentiated nature of moral emotions.