Citation

Morey DS. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 2011; 55(2): 263-275.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2011, John Wiley and Sons)

DOI

10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00488.x

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

This study develops a dynamic model of the rivalry process, explicitly connecting the conflicts that form rivalries. The model demonstrates how these conflicts combine to form an especially conflict‐prone relationship. Using numerical simulations of the model, I deduce and test a hypothesis connecting dyadic conflict and rivalry termination. High‐concentration conflicts increase the probability of rivalry termination by causing a sharp and sustained drop in public support for future military action. Dyadic conflict between rivals can bring peace, under the right circumstances. The article concludes with a discussion of the model's implications for policymakers seeking to limit international violence.