Citation

Farmer A, Tiefenthaler J. Rec. Soc. Econ. 1997; 55(3): 337.

Copyright

(Copyright © 1997, Informa - Taylor and Francis Group)

DOI

10.1080/00346769700000004

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

While economists have been studying the family as an economic unit for almost thirty years, most models have focused on cooperative family units. Domestic violence, one of the most widespread violent crimes against women, is one example of a family unit that is better explained as a noncooperative relationship. In this paper, a noncooperative model of domestic violence is presented. The comparative statics from this model predict that women's incomes and other financial support received from outside the marriage (family, welfare, shelters, divorce settlements, etc.) will decrease the level of violence in intact families because they increase the woman's threat point. Implications of the theoretical model are discussed and empirical evidence is summarized. The results from existing and new analysis provide support for the hypothesis that improved economic opportunities for women will decrease the level of violence in abusive relationships.