Citation

Sommers T. Philos. Q. 2007; 57(228): 321-341.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2007, John Wiley and Sons)

DOI

10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.487.x

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

I aim to alleviate the pessimism with which some philosophers regard the ‘objective attitude’, thereby removing a particular obstacle which P.F. Strawson and others have placed in the way of more widespread scepticism about moral responsibility. First, I describe what I consider the objective attitude to be, and then address concerns about this raised by Susan Wolf. Next, I argue that aspects of certain attitudes commonly thought to be opposed to the objective attitude are in fact compatible with it. Finally, I examine the prospects of someone who wishes to adopt the objective attitude permanently. In response to philosophers who claim that this would be psychologically impossible, I argue that our commitment to attitudes that presuppose moral responsibility can soften and fade, often without our noticing it.