Citation

Hanfling O. Phil. Investig. 2008; 31(2): 105-123.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2008, John Wiley and Sons)

DOI

10.1111/j.1467-9205.2007.00337.x

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Applying a broadly Wittgensteinian view of knowledge and its relation to the conditions in which the word “know” is ordinarily used, the paper defends the claim that there can be knowledge (and thus also truth) in moral matters and rejects the idea that a cross-culturally homogeneous moral language is a necessary condition for this. However, the fact that moral knowledge is available sometimes does not imply that it is available always. Taking issue in particular with Ronald Dworkin, the paper also argues that where moral questions are a matter of judgement, there may well be no right answer to them and, further, that this is a feature by no means unique to moral discourse.