Citation

Meernik J. Int. Stud. Perspect. 2008; 9(2): 165-182.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2008, John Wiley and Sons)

DOI

10.1111/j.1528-3585.2008.00325.x

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Suspected war criminals who remain at large can do great damage to post-conflict, peace-building efforts. I develop a model of war criminal apprehension predicated on the behavior of international actors to alter the cost/benefit calculus of suspected war criminals and their supporters and make them either more susceptible to capture or make them more likely to surrender. I test this model with duration analysis using data from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia regarding the indictment and capture/surrender (if achieved) of over 100 individuals wanted for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. The results demonstrate that not only is it possible to model these phenomena, but that there are a variety of actions the international community can take to facilitate the capture and surrender of suspected war criminals.