Citation

Shandra JM. Sociol. Inq. 2007; 77(4): 543-571.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2007, Alpha Kappa Delta, Publisher John Wiley and Sons)

DOI

10.1111/j.1475-682X.2007.00209.x

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

This research builds upon previous cross-national studies of deforestation. In doing so, I examine how various world-systems indicators interact with political conditions within a nation. I test the hypothesis that repressive nations create a “good business climate” for multinational capital, which, in turn, affects deforestation. This “good business climate” consists of economic incentives (e.g., tax holidays), regulatory concessions (e.g., environmental law exemptions), and imposed political stability (e.g., outlawing strikes, protests, and unions). The results indicate that export partner concentration, commodity concentration, multinational corporate penetration, and International Monetary Fund conditionality increase deforestation more at higher rather than at lower levels of repression. I also confirm previous findings that gross domestic product per capita decreases deforestation, indicating that richer nations are able to externalize their environmental costs onto poorer nations. I conclude with the theoretical implications of this research, policy implications, and possible directions for future research.