Citation

Laitin DD. Int. Migr. Rev. 2009; 43(1): 35-59.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2009, Center for Migration Studies, New York, Inc., Publisher John Wiley and Sons)

DOI

10.1111/j.0197-9183.2008.01146.x

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

This paper explains why international migrants, who face numerous security and cultural threats in their host societies, are almost never implicated in civil war violence. This is quite different from situations of internal migration, which often set off violence that escalates to civil war proportions. The paper first lays out the stark contrast between the political implications of external and internal migration based on data adapted from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset. It then explores the reasons for the low incidence of civil war violence for international migrants through an examination of three cases: Bahrain, which has a large expatriate community without political rights that has been politically quiescent; Estonia, where some 30 percent of the population are disaffected Russian-speakers linked to post-World War II migrations from other republics of the Soviet Union; and Pakistan, where the immigrant Muhajirs are a partial exception to the general pattern outlined in this paper. It concludes with a general statement of the relationship between immigration and rebellion, where the level of grievances is less consequential than the conditions that make insurgency pay off.