Citation

Glass TA, Schoch-Spana M. Clin. Infect. Dis. 2002; 34(2): 217-223.

Affiliation

Center on Aging and Health and the Department of Epidemiology, Johns Hopkins University Bloomberg School of Public Health, Baltimore, MD 21205, USA. tglass@jhsph.edu

Copyright

(Copyright © 2002, University of Chicago Press)

DOI

10.1086/338711

PMID

11740711

Abstract

Bioterrorism policy discussions and response planning efforts have tended to discount the capacity of the public to participate in the response to an act of bioterrorism, or they have assumed that local populations would impede an effective response. Fears of mass panic and social disorder underlie this bias. Although it is not known how the population will react to an unprecedented act of bioterrorism, experience with natural and technological disasters and disease outbreaks indicates a pattern of generally effective and adaptive collective action. Failure to involve the public as a key partner in the medical and public-health response could hamper effective management of an epidemic and increase the likelihood of social disruption. Ultimately, actions taken by nonprofessional individuals and groups could have the greatest influence on the outcome of a bioterrorism event. Five guidelines for integrating the public into bioterrorism response planning are proposed: (1) treat the public as a capable ally in the response to an epidemic, (2) enlist civic organizations in practical public health activities, (3) anticipate the need for home-based patient care and infection control, (4) invest in public outreach and communication strategies, and (5) ensure that planning reflects the values and priorities of affected populations.

Language: en