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Citation |
Oh S. Atten. Percept. Psychophys. 2011; 73(5): 1336-1343. |
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Affiliation |
Department of Psychology, Kyungnam University, 449 Woryeong-dong Masanhappo-gu, Changwon-si, Gyeongsangnam-do, South Korea, 631701, songjoo@kyungnam.ac.kr. |
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Copyright |
(Copyright © 2011, Holtzbrinck Springer Nature Publishing Group) |
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DOI |
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PMID |
21448766 |
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Abstract |
Some figures, such as the Necker cube, are spontaneously reversible between alternative percepts. Before learning those skilled reversals, how do people achieve reversals for the very first time? It has been known that, in the case of a first reversal, people can be expected to see the reversal when given specific information about how the figures are ambiguous. This point was confirmed by using drawing versions of reversible figures. To demonstrate how intention plays a role in the initial reversal of a real object, a pair of regular eyeglasses, reversible in perspective, were presented to naïve observers in monocular vision. When the eyeglasses were viewed inwardly and the observers were given information that the eyeglasses could be ambiguous, they were able to easily see the reversal. When the eyeglasses were viewed outwardly, observers saw it only after they had been informed of exactly what the two alternative percepts were.Interestingly, many observers often mistakenly saw the inwardly viewed eyeglasses as placed outwardly from the beginning of the observation, while they saw the outwardly viewed eyeglasses correctly. Taking these results together, for the first reversal of a real object, the specificity of intention varies with the ambiguity of the object. Language: en |