Citation

Pezdek K, Blandon-Gitlin I, Lam S, Hart RE, Schooler JW. Mem. Cognit. 2006; 34(8): 1628-1635.

Affiliation

Department of Psychology, Claremont Graduate University, Claremont, CA 91711-3955, USA. kathy.pezdek@cgu.edu

Copyright

(Copyright © 2006, Psychonomic Society)

DOI

unavailable

PMID

17489289

Abstract

False memories are more likely to be planted for plausible than for implausible events, but does just knowing about an implausible event make individuals more likely to think that the event happened to them? Two experiments assessed the independent contributions o f plausibility a nd background knowledge to planting false beliefs. In Experiment 1, subjects rated 20 childhood events as to the likelihood of each event having happened to them. The list included the implausible target event "received an enema," a critical target event of Pezdek, Finger, and Hodge (1997). Two weeks later, subjects were presented with (1) information regarding the high prevalence rate of enemas; (2) background information on how to administer an enema; (3) neither type of information; or (4) both. Immediately or 2 weeks later, they rated the 20 childhood events again. Only plausibility significantly increased occurrence ratings. In Experiment 2, the target event was changed from "barium enema administered in a hospital" to "home enema for constipation"; significant effects of both plausibility and background knowledge resulted. The results suggest that providing background knowledge can increase beliefs about personal events, but that its impact is limited by the extent of the individual's familiarity with the context of the suggested target event.

Language: en