Citation

Spragens TA. Rev. Polit. 1993; 55(2): 193-216.

Copyright

(Copyright © 1993, University of Notre Dame, Publisher Cambridge University Press)

DOI

unavailable

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Theories of social justice are either hegemonic (defending a single determinate standard), skeptical (finding social justice to be radically indeterminate if not meaningless), or pluralistic (claiming that we can disqualify all but a handful of standards, but that we cannot definitively adjudicate among these). I offer here a variation of the pluralistic view, arguing that a single standard cannot be definitive because of what is termed the antinomies of social justice. These antinomies arise where the demands of justice collide with elements of the gratuitous that are morally valid or are practically unavoidable. Where this occurs, all possible distribution rules turn out to be unfair. An important implication of the argument is that liberal democracies cannot find their grounds for consensus, as John Rawls contends, in a common attachment to principles of justice. Instead, common interests and civic friendship will always be necessary supplements to the sense of justice as a source of social bonds in a free society.

The hazards of life inflict suffering on people. The incidence of this -- absent a belief in karma -- must be characterized as random and arbitrary -- at least in significant measure. If I ride my motorcycle without wearing a helmet and suffer brain damage in a collision, then my lack of due care was an important contributing cause to my misfortune.