Citation

Szeto W, O'Brien L, O'Mahony M. Transp. Traffic Theory 2007; 17: 127-153.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2007, Publisher varies)

DOI

unavailable

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Traditionally, the risk-averse traffic assignment is described by a game played between network users who seek minimum cost routes and demons that seek to improve maximum costs on the network users by damaging links in the network. This problem assumes the presence of one and only one active origin-destination (OD) specific demon in each OD pair, and furthermore assumes the capacity reduction to be 50% if the link is selected for damage by one or more OD specific demons. In this paper, the authors relax these two assumptions and propose a multiple network demon formulation in which each demon is free to select any link to damage. Numerical studies are carried out to examine the effects of relaxing the two assumptions on expected network cost, give an insight into the network demon behavior in selecting links to damage, demonstrate the existence of multiple solutions to the proposed game, and compare the link selection behavior of the OD specific and network demons and their impacts on expected network cost. Overall the results indicate the importance of the assumptions used to expected network cost and reliability measures and also to provide some further insights into the nature of the route choice game.