Citation

Miller JS, Feltz A. Conscious. Cogn. 2011; 20(2): 401-414.

Affiliation

Florida State University, Department of Philosophy, United States.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2011, Elsevier Publishing)

DOI

10.1016/j.concog.2010.10.015

PMID

21159523

Abstract

An important disagreement in contemporary debates about free will hinges on whether an agent must have alternative possibilities to be morally responsible. Many assume that notions of alternative possibilities are ubiquitous and reflected in everyday intuitions about moral responsibility: if one lacks alternatives, then one cannot be morally responsible. We explore this issue empirically. In two studies, we find evidence that folk judgments about moral responsibility call into question two popular principles that require some form of alternative possibilities for moral responsibility. Survey participants given scenarios involving agents that fail to satisfy these principles nonetheless found these agents to be (1) morally responsible, (2) blameworthy, (3) deserving of blame, and (4) at fault for morally bad actions and consequences. We defend our interpretation of this evidence against objections and explore some implications of these findings for the free will debate.

Language: en