Citation

Ungari A. War Hist. 2010; 17(4): 403-434.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2010, SAGE Publishing)

DOI

10.1177/0968344510378458

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

The paper aims to illustrate the debate regarding the Italian air force in the period from 1910 to 1918. On the one hand, a vast front began to form, including a large part of public opinion and a number of members of parliament, which called for the need to strengthen the wartime use of aviation. On the other hand, the strongest resistance against strengthening Italian aviation, at least up to the outbreak of the First World War, came from military and governmental circles. The army chief of staff, Alberto Pollio, and many generals did not realize the devastating wartime capabilities of aviation; the top military ranks always considered aviation to be an auxiliary force, a means of support for infantry, artillery or engineers. Italy, at a government level, did not have the raw materials or finance available to such countries as France, Britain, and Germany. If the limited budget influenced wartime aviation production, it was the scepticism of the top military ranks, from Pollio to Cadorna and in the end Diaz, that prevented the creation of an autonomous aeronautic arm that, following the example set by Britain and France, was provided with its own officer corps, its own structures and adequate financing to favour its development.