Citation

Theotokis G. War Hist. 2010; 17(4): 381-402.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2010, SAGE Publishing)

DOI

10.1177/0968344510376463

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

By 1060 the Normans of Melfi had greatly expanded their dominions in Apulia and Calabria. The next step in their ambitious plans in the Italian peninsula, the invasion of Sicily, took place in 1061: it was not completed before 1091, mostly owing to a combination of political setbacks in the mainland, along with several inefficiencies in Norman military organization. No comprehensive study of the military aspects of the Norman conquest of Sicily has been written, and this paper intends to cover this specific gap. It deals with the first two stages of the Sicilian conquest, the period between the first invasion of 1061 and the first unsuccessful siege of Palermo in 1064, and the second period, which is marked by the five-month siege and capture of the Muslim capital in 1072. It examines the composition of the Norman and Muslim armies, in terms not only of numbers but also of the ration of cavalry, infantry and auxiliary units. It also considers how far the Normans had been willing to adapt to the Mediterranean reality of warfare, more specifically the construction of siege engines and of a navy capable of imposing a blockade and transporting troops and horses from the Italian mainland to Sicily; the Norman fighting tactics used in the field of battle against the Muslims; and whether those tactics changed during the several stages of the Sicilian conquest.