Citation

Bossi P, Garin D, Combadière B, Rouleau E, Rigaudeau S, LebrunVignes B, Martinez V, Autran B, Bricaire F. Presse Med. (1983) 2005; 34(2 Pt 2): 177-184.

Vernacular Title

Risque de variole, vaccination et bioterrorisme.

Affiliation

Service des maladies infectieuses et tropicales, Groupe hospitalier, Pitié-Salpêtrière, 47-83, Bd de l'Hôpital, 75013 Paris, France. philippe.bossi@psl.ap-hop-paris.fr

Copyright

(Copyright © 2005, Elsevier Publishing)

DOI

unavailable

PMID

15706726

Abstract

The use of the smallpox virus as a biological weapon is very old. Confronted with a high probability of a current bioterrorist menace, counteracting strategies have been developed. One of the principle aims relies on the vaccination of teams dedicated to the management of persons infected and the stocking of vaccine for the whole population of a country. Following worldwide eradication of the disease, preventive vaccination was topped in 1978 in France for the primo-vaccination, and in 1984 for repeat vaccinations. The various strains used in the first generation vaccinations are weakened living vaccine, the natural host and origin of which is unknown. Second and third generations vaccines are under study; the principle objective is to obtain efficacy with a minimum of side effects. There are two types of adverse events, generally observed with the first generation vaccines: the first, extremely rare, can be life-threatening; the others, more frequent (10 to 15% of patients) are benign. In emergency situations, in the presence of smallpox, there should be no absolute contraindications to vaccination. In the bioterrorist context, massive vaccination campaigns of the population are unadvisable (because of the considerable risk of death and severe adverse events) in the absence of any real permit, in each case, definition of the vaccinal strategy to be adopted.

Language: fr