Citation

Nagl JA, Burton BM. Wash. Q. 2009; 32(2): 91.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2009, Georgetown University, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Publisher Informa - Taylor and Francis Group)

DOI

10.1080/01636600902772836

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

After a slow start, the U.S. military has made remarkable strides in adapting to irregular warfare in Afghanistan and Iraq, and is beginning to institutionalize those adaptations. Recent Department of Defense (DOD) directives and field manuals have elevated stability operations and counterinsurgency to the same level of importance as conventional military offensive and defensive operations. These changes are the outcome of deep reflection about the nature of current and likely future threats to U.S. national security and the military’s role in addressing them. They represent important steps toward transforming a sclerotic organizational culture that long encouraged a 'we don’t do windows' posture on so-called 'military operations other than war,' even as the nation’s leaders called upon the armed forces to perform those types of missions with increasing frequency.

Despite the clear need for change from a Cold War military to one that can deal with the threats of the current century, numerous military officers and civilian experts have challenged the U.S. military’s development of improved theory and practice for irregular warfare.