Citation

Alderman H, Chiappori PA, Haddad L, Hoddinott J, Kanbur R. World Bank Res. Obs. 1995; 10(1): 1-19.

Copyright

(Copyright © 1995, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, Publisher Oxford University Press)

DOI

10.1093/wbro/10.1.1

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Most development objectives focus on the well-being of individuals. Policies are targeted to increase the percentage of individuals who avoid poverty, who can read, who are free from hunger and illness, or who can find gainful employment. Individual welfare, however, is based in large part on a complex set of interactions among family members.

Until recently most policy analyses implicitly viewed the household as having only one set of preferences. This assumption has been a powerful tool for understanding household behaviour, such as the distribution of tasks and goods. But a growing body of evidence suggests that this view is an expedience that comes at considerable, and possibly avoidable, cost.

There is considerable evidence that domestic violence is prevalent in both industrial and developing countries and that it affects income distribution within the household. Domestic violence clearly refutes justification for the unitary household model based on altruism.

The article argues that more effective policy instruments will emerge from analyzing the processes by which households balance the diverse interests of their members.