Citation

Hynek N. Secur. Dialogue 2010; 41(4): 435-459.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2010, SAGE Publishing)

DOI

10.1177/0967010610374310

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

In recent considerations of deterrence in strategic studies, there are almost no works that would systematically link deterrence to one of the most important current issue areas of contemporary strategic studies: ballistic missile defence (BMD). In an attempt to address this lacuna, this article considers ways in which missile defence has been — and can be — intertwined with deterrence of the 21st century. The article begins with a historical outline of the relationship between nuclear deterrence and BMD, and continues by comparing and contrasting US political and strategic-planning discourses in how they have addressed the examined relationship. What follows is the recasting of traditional understanding of deterrence as a set of disparate modalities underpinned by different principles and organizing logics. The article will show the role and function of BMD in three relevant modalities of deterrence in the 21st century: first, in a renewed strategic deterrence between the USA and Russia based on an axiomatic logic of MAD; second, in the deterrence of rogue states in reaction to their asymmetric nuclear threats; and, finally, in a reverse deterrence from intervention in regional conflicts. Consequently, the presented outline of the three modalities will be theoretically furthered to allow for conceptualization of possible links to BMD in ways in which practical implications for future research, strategic planning and political action can be seen.