Citation

Salmon J. Def. Peace Econ. 1997; 8(1): 57-76.

Copyright

(Copyright © 1997, Informa - Taylor and Francis Group)

DOI

10.1080/10430719708404869

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

The build-up of US military forces in the early 1980s was controversial. Critics charged that the expenditures were made without the benefit of a strategy for how best to use the increased resources and that defense procurements were wasteful. For a time, Secretary Weinberger's administration of the defense department was seriously questioned as lacking any strategic vision. This paper argues that these criticisms have merit, but fail to take into account the political context - both domestic and international - in which the Reagan Administration was operating. The defense build-up fit into a larger national strategy and as such cannot be understood in isolation. This national strategy is discussed and the role played by the Reagan military build-up in the conclusion of the Cold War considered.