Citation

Franck R, Hillman AL, Krausz M. Def. Peace Econ. 2005; 16(5): 347-364.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2005, Informa - Taylor and Francis Group)

DOI

10.1080/10242690500207399

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

The economic theory of defense has traditionally described public safety as achieved through investments that deter adversaries. Deterrence is, however, ineffective and pre-emptive defense is required when a population of intended victims confronts supreme-value suicide terror. A moral dilemma then arises, since pre-emption may impose collective punishment, while in the absence of pre-emption the population of intended victims is exposed to acts of terror. We consider how a population of intended terror victims confronts the moral dilemma, and compare the threatened population's response with the public-safety recommendations of external judges who are not personally affected by the threat of terror.