Citation

Kammler H. Def. Peace Econ. 1997; 8(1): 1-16.

Copyright

(Copyright © 1997, Informa - Taylor and Francis Group)

DOI

10.1080/10430719708404866

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

The analysis of military expenditure, inside alliances as well as outside, has gained much when the original Olson-Zeckhauser approach was generalized into the joint-product model of alliances as developed by Todd Sandier and others. This model allowed, as benefits to allies determining military expenditure, not only deterrence, a pure collective good, but partially collective goods like conventional fighting power and private (country-specific) benefits. The papers in this Special Issue explore the explanatory potential of also considering the demand for positional goods, in particular great-power status, as a determinant of military expenditure. The “exploitation of the strong by the weak” characterizing NATO until the early 1970s and during the American defence buildup of 1980-1985 might also be explained by an informal leader-follower bargain between the United States and its allies who traded acceptance of American hegemony for military protection and “hegemonic stability” of the world economy.