Citation

Rowlands D, Carment D. Def. Peace Econ. 2006; 17(5): 435-456.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2006, Informa - Taylor and Francis Group)

DOI

10.1080/10242690600888213

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Throughout the 1990s multilateral interventions often deviated significantly from traditional peacekeeping in terms of mandate complexity, level of force, and the absence of consent and impartiality. This paper develops a formal model of biased intervention and specifies propositions regarding its effects on combatant behaviour. We find that the response to the intervener depends on the how the combatants divide their labour resources between production and fighting, the amount of resources the intervener transfers between the combatants, and the degree to which the intervener's military efforts affect the effectiveness of the combatant's military forces. NATO's intervention in Kosovo is then used as a case study to illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of the model. Finally, we identify the theoretical and policy-relevant implications of the model and outline directions for future research.