Citation

Besancenot D, Vranceanu R. Def. Peace Econ. 2006; 17(1): 23-36.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2006, Informa - Taylor and Francis Group)

DOI

10.1080/10242690500216580

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, European governments adopted a hands-off policy towards the defence industrial base, in an attempt to increase the sector's efficiency and reactivity. In this context, one topical issue is how to motivate defence firms to apply for private rather than public finance. Since banks have no prior experience with European defence firms, a problem of asymmetric information may block this transition. The problem is analysed within the framework of a game between defence firms and banks. It is shown that the Bayesian Equilibrium might correspond to a situation where low-risk firms prefer the state-financed scheme; yet, in a perfect information set-up, the same firms would apply for bank credit. In order to facilitate the transition to private finance, the government might decide to subsidize investors who agree on financing defence firms; the state aid should be made available during a transitory learning period.