Citation

Molas-Gallart J. Def. Peace Econ. 1997; 8(3): 267-306.

Copyright

(Copyright © 1997, Informa - Taylor and Francis Group)

DOI

10.1080/10430719708404882

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

From the early 1980s Spain embarked on a wide-ranging process of military reform, from organisational changes to defence industrial policies. Investment in military equipment was set to grow, policies were drawn up to foster the domestic defence industrial base, defence R&D rocketed, and Spain joined a myriad of international arms development programmes. Yet, by 1991 the process of reform had run out of steam. Expenditure planning proved unreliable, and firms suffered from sharp cutbacks in procurement expenditure. The model of defence industrial growth sketched in the mid-1980s had floundered. The Spanish case provides an example of how the quest to maximise defence procurement from domestic sources can fall victim to industrial and budgetary constraints. Spanish defence producers are now becoming increasingly intertwined with foreign defence companies.