Citation

Sundström P. J. Med. Ethics 1995; 21(1): 35-38.

Copyright

(Copyright © 1995, BMJ Publishing Group)

DOI

unavailable

PMID

7776346

PMCID

PMC1376530

Abstract

The Australian bioethicist Peter Singer has presented an intriguing argument for the opinion that it is quite proper (morally) to deem the lives of certain individuals not worth living and so to kill them. The argument is based on the alleged analogy between the ordinary clinical judgement that a life with a broken leg is worse than a life with an intact leg (other things being equal), and that the broken leg therefore ought to be mended, on the one hand, and the judgement that the lives of some individuals, for example, severely disabled infants, are not worth living and therefore ought to be terminated, on the other. In the present article it is argued that Singer's argument is flawed, intellectually and/or ethically.

Language: en